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A margin squeeze is said to occur when a vertically integrated firm (i.e a firm that 
operates in both an upstream and downstream market) leverages its dominance in the 
upstream market by selling its upstream commodity to its downstream competitors at 
such a price as to reduce or possibly even extinguish the downstream competitor’s 
profit margin.1 
On 12 April 2012, the Constitutional Court of South Africa delivered a decision2 
bringing to its head a series of judgments pertaining to an application brought against 
Senwes Limited (“Senwes”) a public company (formally a cooperative) operating in 
the agricultural sector in respect of an allegation that it had engaged in conduct 
meeting the criteria of a margin squeeze abuse. First, the Competition Tribunal 
confirmed that Senwes had engaged in conduct meeting the criteria of a margin 
squeeze abuse. The Competition Tribunal’s decision was appealed by Senwes to the 
Competition Appeal Court. The Competition Appeal Court upheld the Competition 
Tribunal’s finding. Senwes was successful in appealing this decision to the Supreme 
Court of Appeal despite the fact that the Competition Appeal Court did not grant it 
leave to appeal. The Supreme Court of Appeal’s ruling was ultimately overturned by 
the Constitutional court which confirmed the Competition Tribunal’s ruling save a 
caveat regarding the use of the term margin squeeze.  
The Constitutional Court’s ruling has invariably affected the manner in which 
future complaints of a margin squeeze3 in South Africa will be addressed. Other than 
the fact that the decision was handed down by the highest court for all constitutional 
matters,4 this decision is of particular significance because there have been no other 
South African judicial decisions that have dealt with the concept of a margin squeeze 
as the primary complaint. 
                                                
1 Alison Jones & Brenda Sufrin EU Competition Law 4 ed (2011) 413. 
2 Competition Commission of South Africa v Senwes Limited 2012 (7) BCLR 667 (CC). 
3 Whereas this dissertation will refer to margin squeeze for purposes of consistency, the term ‘price 
squeeze’ is also widely used in literature to refer to the same concept. 





There has been much debate internationally regarding the margin squeeze abuse 
including a stark division in approach between one the one hand the United Kingdom 
(“UK”) and the European Union (“EU”) which recognizes its application versus the 
United States (“US”) which has rejected margin squeeze as a standalone cause of 
action.5 
Following the introduction of the margin squeeze cause of action into South 
African competition law jurisprudence, the question arises whether the Senwes 
decisions, have definitively clarified the criteria against which future margin squeeze 
abuse cases will be dealt with and whether these criteria have evolved into a 
standalone cause of action. This dissertation will demonstrate the absurdity of the 
Constitutional Court decision, to delete all references to margin squeeze in the 
decision of the Competition Tribunal which it upheld while retaining the underlying 
criteria against which future margin squeeze cases will be adjudicated. This 
dissertation will additionally demonstrate that the Senwes cases, in particular the 
Tribunal decision read with the Constitutional Court decision, have on the one hand 
only marginally delineated and elaborated on the elements necessary to establish a 
margin squeeze abuse, but have on the other hand established margin squeeze as a 
standalone cause of action in terms of which offending firms can be prosecuted in 
South African competition jurisprudence. 
 
(a) Scope 
Following the introduction contained in Chapter 1, Chapter 2 will expound on the 
meaning of abuse of dominance in general and will specifically demonstrate the 
manner in which the margin squeeze cause of action fits into the abuse of dominance 
framework. This chapter will then review the various forms that a margin squeeze 
may take and will conclude with an analysis of the application of the margin squeeze 
principle in foreign jurisdictions. Chapter 3 will contain an analysis of the Senwes 
decisions in an effort to give context to the critical analysis of the margin squeeze 
cause of action in the following chapter. Chapter 4 will consider the applicability and 
relevance of a margin squeeze in South Africa’s competition law dispensation 
                                                
5 Gianluca Faella & Roberto Pardolesi ‘Squeezing Price Squeeze Under EC Antitrust Law’ European 





(hereafter referred to as the “Competition Act”),6 critically unpack the elements of a 
margin squeeze complaint, and critically evaluate the future of the concept of a 
margin squeeze as the basis of a potential South African competition law complaint. 
Chapter 5 will contain conclusions. 
 
(b) Definitions 
In order to better understand the margin squeeze cause of action, it is helpful to 
explain a number of terms that recur in literature in relation thereto.  
Principles such as ‘dominance’ and ‘market’ will be described in greater detail 
below under the subheading of abuse of dominance. 
Before looking at the concept of a vertically integrated firm, it is important to 
understand the difference between the upstream and downstream market, as these 
terms are central in explaining vertical integration. 
At an elemental level the upstream market refers to the supply of an input that is 
relevant (i.e. that can be converted, manufactured or used) in the supply of a product 
or service at the retail (downstream) level.7 The upstream market relates to the 
production or supply of inputs that normally take the form of raw materials, a network 
or facilities. It is at this level that the dominance of the supplier is considered 
important.8 On the other hand, the downstream market refers to the retail market for 
products that have been processed or have received some input from the upstream 
input.9 
A vertically integrated firm is a firm that is dominant or controls the supply of 
products in the upstream market and simultaneously participates in a competitive 
market downstream.10 In other words, if the upstream and downstream divisions of a 
firm form part of or fall within a single economic entity, then it can be said that the 
firm is vertically integrated.11 By virtue of its dominance in the upstream market, the 
vertically integrated firm would be able to manipulate the price it charges at the 
                                                
6 Competition Act of South Africa Act 89 of 1998. 
7 Pietro Crocioni & Cento Veljanovski ‘Price Squeezes, Foreclosure and Competition Law: Principles 
and Guidelines’ (2003) 4 1 Journal of Network Industries 28 at 42. 
8 Crocioni & Veljanovski op cit note 7. 
9 Richard Whish Competition Law 6 ed (2008) 744-745. 
10 Ibid note 9 at 744; see also Luke Kelly & Tjarda van der Vijver ‘Less is More: Senwes and the 
Concept of Margin Squeeze in South African Competition Law’ (2009) 2 SALJ 246 at 246. 





upstream and/or downstream level in such a manner as to impede the downstream 
firm’s ability to cover its costs.12 This would be considered a competition law offence 
because the dominant firm would limit the ability of its rivals from entering into or 
expanding within a market.13 
 
(c) Delimitations 
This dissertation will not contain an analysis of the economic theory or workings of 
the margin squeeze concept. Instead, it will focus on the jurisprudential application of 
the concept. 
This dissertation will also not contain a comparative analysis of the margin 
squeeze concept between South Africa and international jurisdictions. International 
references will instead describe the manner in which the cause of action is applied in 
the relevant jurisdiction. 
                                                
12 Chares River Associates ‘Competition Memo: Margin Squeezes and the Inefficient “Equally 
Efficient Operator”’ 2010, available at http://www.crai.com/ecp/assets/Margin_squeezes.pdf accessed 
on 19 November 2012. 
13 Competition Act op cit note 6 section 1 for the definition of exclusionary act; see also Lizél Blignaut, 
Louise du Plessis & Judd Lurie ‘Vertical Integration and the refusal to supply scarce goods – legal and 
economic framework  for analysis of prohibited practices’ 2010 para 7.5, available at 
http://www.compcom.co.za/assets/Uploads/events/Fourth-Competition-Law-Conferece/Session-








I. INTRODUCTION TO THE ‘MARGIN SQUEEZE’ COMPLAINT 
A margin squeeze is in most instances classified under the general prohibited conduct 
of abuse of dominance.14 The abuse of dominance framework therefore sets the 
foundation on which allegations of margin squeeze will be prosecuted. 
 
II. ABUSE OF DOMINANCE 
The Competition Act15 prohibits anti-competitive conduct that is performed by two or 
more parties acting in concert with one another by for example dividing markets 
through the allocation of customers. It also prohibits anti-competitive conduct that is 
performed by a firm acting unilaterally in the form of abuse of dominance as 
contemplated under Part B of Chapter 2 the Competition Act.16 
The abuse of dominance provisions are structured such that section 6 sets out 
thresholds to ascertain whether a firm qualifies to be scrutinised under Part B of 
Chapter 2 the Competition Act. Section 7 of the Competition Act sets out the 




When determining whether the abuse provisions apply, one must firstly enquire 
whether the respondent firm’s gross annual turnover in, into or from South Africa is 
valued at or exceeds R5 million, or its gross assets in South Africa are valued at or 
                                                
14 OECD: Policy Round Tables ‘Margin Squeeze 2009’ 2009 at 8 available at 
http://www.oecd.org/regreform/liberalisationandcompetitioninterventioninregulatedsectors/46048803.
pdf accessed on 19 November 2012. 
15 Competition Act op cit note 6. 
16 Desmond Rudman & Sima Ostrovsky ‘Dominance Test: a superfluous jurisdictional hurdle?’ 2010 at 
1, available at http://www.compcom.co.za/assets/Uploads/events/Fourth-Competition-Law-
Conferece/Session-4B/article-dominance-test.pdf accessed on 15 July 2013. 





exceed R5 million.18 If a firm meets or exceeds this threshold, it will then qualify to 
be prosecuted under the provisions of Part B of Chapter 2 of the Competition Act. 
The next stage of the enquiry is set out in section 7 of the Competition Act which 
requires that one determine the relevant market followed by an enquiry into whether 
the firm is in fact dominant in such market.19  
 
(b) Determination of Market 
The Competition Act does not define the criteria to be used when defining a market.20 
Whereas various disciplines adopt different approaches to defining a market, within 
the realm of competition law in general, and in South Africa in particular, the 
approach adopted is theoretical and involves outlining that part of the market that 
would be worth monopolising, taking into consideration any substitutes that would 
limit a firm’s ability to exercise its monopoly.21 This approach is also referred to as 
the Hypothetical Monopolist test, and is primarily attributed to the US competition 
universe.22 
The Hypothetical Monopolist test is most commonly applied by means of the 
thought experiment methodology otherwise known as the SSNIP (small but 
significant and non-transitory increase in price) test.23 The test involves conducting an 
economic analysis on an initially narrowly defined market so as to ascertain whether 
it is the relevant market. This entails increasing the price levied by the respective 
hypothetical monopolist by a small but significant margin above a notional 
competitive price (usually by 5% to 10%). If the increase causes consumers to switch 
to substitutable products or new entrants are attracted to the market then this indicates 
that the relevant market is wider than the initially narrowly defined market. With this 
                                                
18 Competition Act op cit note 6 section 6; see also Determination of Threshold Regulations in GN 253 
GG 22025 of 1 February 2001; see also Amendment to Determination of Threshold Regulations in GN 
562 GG 22128 of 9 March 2001. 
19 Competition Commission v South African Airways (Pty) Ltd 2005 18/CR/Mar01 ZACT 50 at 4 para 
11. 




=bv.49784469,d.ZGU accessed on 28 July  2013. 
21 Boshoff op cit note 20 at 4. 
22 Ibid at 7-8. 





is mind, the relevant market is therefore the collection of goods or services in respect 
of which an hypothetical monopolist would be able to charge a price that is 
significantly above the notional competitive price.24 
The SSNIP test has been criticised for its conceptual, empirical and even 
theoretical challenges. This has resulted in competition literature developing a range 
of tools for purposes of defining a relevant market.25 As illustrated in the judgement 
of Primedia and others v The Competition Commission and another26 it is generally 
agreed that “it is far more meaningful to state propositions about relative relations 
between potential competitors than to make conclusions about absolute boundaries to 
markets”. This conclusion is noteworthy as it elevates the enquiry of defining markets 
from a two dimensional theoretical exercise to a three dimensional enquiry that makes 
provision for the relative nuances of the respective market. 
The need to ascertain the relevant market affected by the abuse also extends to the 
territorial limits within which firms operate.27 This relates to both the geographical as 
well as product markets.28  
The enquiry into territorial limits seeks to answer the question whether the 
offending conduct took place within the territorial limits prescribed by section 3 of the 
Competition Act which, subject to certain exceptions, encapsulates all economic 
activity within, or having an effect within the Republic of South Africa. Conduct 
falling outside of these limits will not trigger the provisions of the Competition Act, 
unless it can be shown that such conduct has an effect within the Republic. 
The fundamental principle to keep in mind when working out the relevant market 
(whether one is applying the SSNIP test or ascertaining the territorial limits prescribed 
by section 3 of the Competition Act) is that it is the market wherein the abuse took 
place that should form the basis of the determination.29 Knowledge of the relevant 
market also aids in calculating a firms market share within the defined market.30 
 
                                                
24 Rudman & Ostrovsky op cit note 16 at 7 – 8 para 3.2.1. 
25 Boshoff op cit note 20 at 3 - 4. 
26 Primedia and others v The Competition Commission and another 2008 39/AM/MAY06 ZACT 13 at 
17 fn 39. 
27 J Neethling & BR Rutherford LAWSA ‘Competition’ Law of South Africa Vol 2(2) para 244. 
28 Ibid para 244. 
29 Ibid para 52. 






Once the market has been ascertained, the next step of the enquiry is to determine 
whether the firm is dominant within that market.31 Section 7 of the Competition Act 
provides that a firm is dominant if it: 
• has at least 45% of the market;  
• has at least 35% but less than 45% of that market, unless it can show that it 
does not have market power; or  
• it has less than 35% of that market but has market power. 
Market power as defined in section 1 of the act is deemed to exist when a firm can 
satisfy either of three conditions being when a firm has the ability to - 
• control prices;  
• exclude competition; or  
• behave to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, customers or 
suppliers. 
Section 7 connects the concepts of market shares and market power by using 
presumptions of dominance based on a mixture of meeting certain market share 
thresholds or having market power.32 
In the South African context, the methodology employed in determining whether a 
firm is dominant is, 
‘commonly…based on the relative sales revenues of the firms in the 
particular market. Whilst sometimes other figures are used, number of 
goods sold etc, this is often because sales revenue figures are not 
available, rather than the fact that they are not considered a reliable 
statistic for the purpose of determining market share.’33 
Emphasis is placed on relative sales figures although room is made for other 
factors to be taken into consideration. In this regard, one should bear in mind that 
market shares are viewed as proxies for the determination market power of firms.34 
It should be noted that it is not the possession of market power that is problematic, 
but instead, its abuse that should attract censure.35 
                                                
31 FFS Refineries (Pty) Ltd v Eskom CT 2002 64/CR/Sep02 ZACT 9 at 4 para 13. 
32 Rudman & Ostrosvky op cit note 16 at 4 para 2.1. 
33 Neethling & Rutherford LAWSA op cit note 27 at 14 para 58. 






(d) Prohibited Conduct/Abusive behaviour 
Once it has been established that the respondent firm has triggered the above 
requirements, the next stage of the enquiry is to ascertain whether the respondent firm 
has engaged in any prohibited conduct as set out in sections 8 and 9 of the 
Competition Act.36 Prohibited conduct describes the legislatures understanding of the 
various manifestations of abusive behaviour. 
An abuse (prohibited conduct) essentially occurs when a firm, acting within a 
particular market, is powerful enough (even if acting alone) to distort competition.37 
Section 8 prohibits the following type of abusive conduct: 
• charging an excessive price to the detriment of consumers; 
• refusing to give a competitor access to an essential facility when it is 
economically feasible to do so; 
• engaging in an exclusionary act (other than those listed under paragraph iv below) 
if the anti-competitive effect of that act outweighs its technological, efficiency or 
other pro-competitive gain; 
• engaging in any of the following specific exclusionary acts, unless the firm 
concerned can show technological, efficiency or other pro-competitive gains 
which outweigh the anticompetitive effect of its act - 
- requiring or inducing a supplier to not deal with a competitor (also referred to 
as an inducement not to deal); 
- refusing to supply scarce goods to a competitor when it is economically 
feasible to do so; 
- selling products on condition that the buyer purchase separate goods or 
services unrelated to the object of a contract, or forcing a buyer to accept a 
condition related to an object of the contract (also referred to as tying or 
bundling); 
- selling products below their marginal or average variable cost (also referred to 
as predation); 
                                                                                                                                       
35 Phillip Sutherland Competition Law of South Africa (2011) para 7.1 
36 Sutherland op cit note 35 para 7.4. 






- buying up a scarce supply of intermediate goods or resources required by a 
competitor. 
Section 9 prohibits a dominant firm from engaging in price discrimination if such 
discrimination is likely to have the effect of substantially preventing or lessening 
competition and it relates to the sale of goods and services in equivalent transactions 
of like grade and quality to different purchasers. 
 
III. CATEGORIES OF ABUSE OF DOMINANCE 
For the sake of convenience, abuse of dominance may be categorised as either (i) 
exclusionary or exploitative; and/or (ii) pricing or non-pricing. It must however be 
appreciated that these categories of abuse are interrelated.38 
 
(a) Exclusionary verses Exploitative Abuses 
Exclusionary abuses occur when a dominant firm prevents or hinders competition 
within a market.39 An exclusionary act as defined in section 1 of the Competition Act 
means an act which impedes or prevents a firm from entering into or expanding 
within a market. Exclusionary abuses are generally prohibited under section 8(c) 
while section 8(d) and its five sub-clauses and section 8(b) proscribe specifically 
defined forms of exclusionary conduct. Sections 8(b) and 8(c) require that the “anti-
competitive effect of that act outweighs its technological, efficiency or other pro-
competitive gain” in order for there to be an abuse. 
An exploitative abuse occurs when a dominant firm takes advantage of its market 
power in order to exploit its customers.40 Section 8(a) contains the sole exploitative 
abuse of the Competition Act,41 in terms of which a dominant firm is prohibited from 
“charg[ing] an excessive price to the detriment of its consumers”. Margin squeeze is 
generally categorised as a form of exclusionary abuse.42   
 
                                                
38 Jones and Sufrin op cit note 1 at 386. 
39 Ibid at 358. 
40 Ibid at 358. 
41 David Lewis ‘Exploitative Abuses – A Note on the Harmony Gold v Mittal Steel Excessive Pricing 
Case’ available at http://www.comptrib.co.za/assets/Uploads/Speeches/lewis12.pdf  accessed on 20 
July 2013. 





(b) Pricing Abuse verses Non-Pricing Abuses 
Pricing abuses occur when firms either raise their prices to unacceptably high levels 
or when they cut their prices to below normal levels.43 Pricing abuses include 
practices such as excessive pricing as well as predatory pricing. Conversely, non-
pricing abuses relate to practices that are not related to a firm’s pricing policies and 
include for instance, a refusal to supply. Margin squeeze is classified as a form of 
pricing abuse.44 
 
(c) Conceptual Considerations for Abuse of Dominance 
The challenges with the concept of abuse of dominance in general are that first, if the 
anti-competitive effects of dominant conduct are proven, then the allegedly offending 
firm will by implication have had the necessary market power and secondly, the 
application of the dominance test is complex and cumbersome. Its elements are also 
not certain and are not always indicative of dominance.45 It has accordingly been 
argued that it is preferable to adopt an effects based approach towards assessing cases 
of abuse without being preceded by the assessment of the dominance of a firm.46 This 
is of relevance, as it speaks to the debate of whether a firm that is not dominant can 
nevertheless be said to conduct a margin squeeze abuse if such conduct has a negative 
effect on a market. 
It should also be noted that intention is not one of the criterion for proving abuse 
of dominance. This is not to say that proof of a firm’s aim to misuse its market power 
or to create an anti-competitive effect will not be admissible as evidence in showing 
that the firm was abusing its dominance.47 This is particularly relevant in that it would 
be challenging for a competing firm to adduce evidence of its dominant competitors 
pricing practices leading to an abuse of margin squeeze. 
Finally, a firm cannot be absolved of its contravention of the abuse of dominance 
provisions by the waiver or consent of a third party with whom it entered into a 
prohibited agreement. In other words, abuse of dominance does not require a third 
                                                
43 Richard Whish Competition Law 7 ed (2012) 716. 
44 Whish op cit note 43 at 755. 
45 Rudman & Ostrovsky op cit note 16 at 7 paras 3.1 and 3.2. 
46 Ibid para 3. 





party victim.48 It is debatable whether this principle will be applicable to a margin 
squeeze abuse due to the fact that one of the criteria which a complainant will have to 
satisfy is that its margin (or that of competitors of the dominant firm in the relevant 
market) has been impaired by the offending pricing practices of the dominant firm. In 
other words it is arguable that margin squeeze abuses do in fact require a victim. 
 
IV. WHAT IS A MARGIN SQUEEZE? 
(a) Liberalization of Markets 
As stated above, margin squeeze as a competition law cause of action is relatively 
new in South African jurisprudence. One of the reasons for this is that margin squeeze 
cases (when viewed against international trends) often occur following the 
liberalization of markets49 such as in the water, railway, postal service and pay 
television sectors.50 This trend is however most evident in the telecommunications 
sector which has seen a large number of margin squeeze cases in jurisdictions such as 
Italy, France, Denmark, Germany and the United Kingdom.51 The South Africa 
telecommunications industry like its international counterparts has not been exempt 
from this trend as is illustrated by the failed attempt by the Competition Commission 
to amend its pleadings in its case against Telkom SA Limited to include the additional 
contravention of a margin squeeze abuse.52 Margin squeeze nevertheless remains a 
fairly novel concept in South Africa. It is opined that this is because South Africa has 
                                                
48 Sutherland op cit note 35 para 7.8; See also Patensie Sitrus Beherend Beperk v Competition 
Commission 2003 16/CAC/Apr02 ZACAC 4 24 and 30. 
49 Competition Commission of South Africa v Senwes Limited 2009 110/CR/Dec06 ZACT 8 para 117. 
50 OECD: Policy Round Tables op cit note14 at 8. 
51  Damien Geradin and Robert O'Donoghue ‘The Concurrent Application of Competition Law and 
Regulation: The Case of Margin Squeeze Abuses in the Telecommunications Sector’ (2005) 1 2 
Journal of Competition Law & Economics 355. 
52 A settlement package agreed to between the Competition Commission and Telkom SA SOC Limited 
requires Telkom SA SOC Limited to maintain separate internal accounts for its retail corporate VPN 
and Internet access products so as to avoid engaging in margin squeeze conduct: see Competition 
Commission of South Africa ‘Media Release: Comission reaches settlement agreement with Telkom’ 
2013 at 1 available at 
http://www.compcom.co.za/assets/Uploads/AttachedFiles/MyDocuments/Commission-reaches-
settlement-agreement-with-Telkom.pdf accessed on 3 November 2013. See also The Competition 





experienced slow liberalization of its public sector53 in comparison to its international 
peers. It is therefore likely that additional cases of margin squeeze may emerge as 
South African markets become more liberalized. 
 
(b) Definition of Margin Squeeze 
A margin squeeze has been defined as,54 
 
‘situations in which a vertically integrated firm not only engages in self-
supply of an input used on a downstream market, but also supplies 
independent third parties active on the downstream market, which are in 
competition with its own business.’ 
 
A margin squeeze occurs when,55 
 
‘a vertically integrated firm with a dominant position in an upstream 
market prevents its non-vertically integrated downstream rivals from 
achieving an economically viable price-cost margin.’ 
 
The above definitions are of value as they pin point key concepts of a margin 
squeeze. Although dealt with in greater detail below, it is useful to note that these key 
concepts are: 56  
• the offending dominant firm is vertically integrated; 
• the vertically integrated firm is the supplier of the input to itself as well as to an 
independent competing firm in a downstream market; 
• the input is essential for downstream competition; 
                                                
53 Afeikhena Jerome ‘Privatization and Regulation in South Africa: An Evaluation’ 2004 at 3 available 
at http://www.competition-regulation.org.uk/conferences/southafrica04/Afeikhena.pdf  accessed on 20 
November 2012. 
54 Robert O’Donoghue and Jorge Padilla The Law and Economics of Article 82 (2006) at 304 cited in 
Competition Commission of South Africa v Senwes Limited supra note 49 at 29 para 117. 
55 Ibid. 
56 The elements are an amalgam of the writer’s views as well as a paraphrase of the popular definitional 





• the vertically integrated firm’s prices would render the activities of an efficient  
non-vertically integrated (competitor) firm in the downstream market 
uneconomic; and 
• there is no objective justification for the vertically integrated firms pricing 
strategy. 
 
(c) Regulated Markets 
As stated above, a margin squeeze may occur when a previously regulated market 
becomes unregulated. 
A margin squeeze is most likely to occur when a vertically integrated firm is 
subject to some form of price restriction at the upstream level while simultaneously 
having little if no regulation at the downstream level.57  
It may not necessarily be sufficient however, for a vertically integrated firm to 
rely on the fact that it is subject to regulation in order to get away with a claim that the 
prices it imposed resulted in a margin squeeze. TeliaSonera58 confirmed the principle 
that regulations will only be considered a defence to anti-compeitive conduct when 
such regulations eliminate any discretion the firm may have with respect to its pricing 
practices. If however the firm can remove or reduce the margin squeeze, then it can be 
held liable for its anti-competitive conduct. 
 
(d) Types of Margin Squeeze 
The criteria for the determination and the existential necessity of the margin squeeze 
concept has been subject to much debate.59 
Although the fundamental principle behind a margin squeeze remains unchanged, 
various forms of the margin squeeze concept can be distinguished. 
Margin squeezes can be distinguished on the basis of a vertically integrated firm’s 
pricing strategy. On this basis, three types of margin squeeze could occur. A vertically 
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integrated firm could increase its upstream price, lower its downstream price or do 
both simultaneously.60 
Margin squeezes can also be distinguished on the basis of whether the price levied 
at the upstream level is discriminatory or non-discriminatory.61 According to these 
distinguishing criteria, a margin squeeze would be discriminatory if a vertically 
integrated firm charged its downstream competitors a higher price for the upstream 
input than it would charge its own downstream operation. On the other hand, a margin 
squeeze would not be considered discriminatory if the vertically integrated firm 
charges an increased price for the upstream input to both its own affiliate in the 
downstream market as well as to its competitors in the downstream market.62 
A margin squeeze may also occur where a vertically integrated firm has market 
power downstream rather than upstream. In this situation, the vertically integrated 
firm would act as a monopsonist (in contradistinction to a monopolist) enabling it to 
purchase an upstream input at a more favourable price (potentially dictating the price) 
than its downstream rivals. By doing so, the vertically integrated firm would be in a 
position to undercut its rivals thereby affecting their profit margins.63 
Predatory margin squeezes occur when a vertically integrated firm charges a 
lower price at the downstream level than the joint costs of input at the upstream level, 
transformation at the downstream level and a margin.64 In other words, this is a 
margin squeeze that takes on the characteristics of predatory behaviour65 (as 
understood in the competition law context).66 
The above types of margin squeeze might differ in structure but, as mentioned 
above, remain fundamentally similar in principle. In effect, a margin squeeze will by 
definition, occur when a firm manages to leverage its vertical integration in such a 
manner as to put pressure on it’s downstream rivals profit making capacity.67 
                                                
60 Crocioni & Veljanovski op cit note 7 at 31. 
61 Ibid at 32. 
62 Crocioni & Veljanovski op cit note 7 at 32. 
63 Ibid at 30. 
64 Ibid at 33. 
65 Ibid; see also Competition Act op cit note 6 at s 8(d)(iv). 
66 According to the European Commission, predatory pricing requires that a firm incur a loss as a result 
of its predatory activity. On the other had a margin squeezes can be profitable even with lower 
downstream prices. This is not to say that higher profits could not be extracted from higher retail prices 
once a firm’s competition has been forced out; see also OECD: Policy Round Tables op cit note14 at 9.  






(e) Status of Margin Squeeze in International Jurisdictions 
Before delving into the specifics of the Senwes case and the status of the margin 
squeeze principle as understood in the South African context, it is of benefit to 
understand the manner in which this principle is handled in the foreign jurisdictions of 
Europe, United Kingdom and the US. These territories have been selected for their 
global influence, as evidenced by the reliance of South Africa’s Competition Tribunal 
and the Competition Appeal Court on,68 as well as for their similarity to South 
African jurisprudential landscape (due to a number of the provisions of the 
Competition Act having been taken from foreign jurisdictions).69 South African courts 
also rely on Canadian and Australian competition law jurisprudence for guidance70  
albeit to a much lesser extent than the European, United Kingdom and the US 
jurisdictions. This dissertation will accordingly place greater emphasis on the 
application of margin squeeze in the European, United Kingdom and the US 
jurisdictions as opposed to the Canadian and Australian jurisdictions. 
On the international level, Margin squeeze cases are somewhat common and a 
number of competition authorities have adjudicated at least a few cases of margin 
squeeze complaints.71 In most of these cases, it is dealt with under the general 
prohibition of abuse of dominance.72 One exception to the abuse of dominance 
classification is found in German legislation which has specific provisions addressing 
margin squeeze cases pertaining to small and medium-sized companies.73 
The following paragraphs will examine not only the manner in which the margin 
squeeze principle is applied in the abovementioned foreign jurisdictions but also 
examine the various arguments for and against the benefit of maintaining the margin 
squeeze principle as a component of Competition Law in light of foreign 
jurisprudence. 
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(i) European Union 
In the European Union (“EU”), Margin Squeeze abuses have been classified under 
Article 102 (previously article 82) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union74 (“EU Treaty”). In essence, article 102 prohibits a firm from abusing its 
dominant position within a market if it would affect trade between member states of 
the EU.  
The Commission as well as General Court decisions of Deutsche Telekom75 
classifies the margin squeeze abuse as specifically falling under Article 102(a) (or 
article 82(a) at the time) with the effect that the abuse is classified as imposing unfair 
prices. It has however been argued that this classification is erroneous in that article 
102(a) relates to the unfairness of the price itself rather than the unfairness of the 
effects of the price as would be the case with a margin squeeze abuse.76 It has also 
been submitted that the wording of Article 102(a) makes provision for only one aspect 
of the margin squeeze.77 It is not clear at which level the ‘unfair’ pricing takes place, 
but it is certainly clear that the Article does not make provision for a vertically 
integrated firm leveraging its upstream market dominance. 
The initial cases dealing with margin squeezes in the EU did not, however, 
handle this form of abuse as an infringement of article 102 of the EU Treaty. For 
instance, the first margin squeeze ruling in the EU was the National Carbonising 
case78 in which the National Coal Board, a vertically integrated firm that was both 
dominant on the upstream market for coal and downstream market (through its 
subsidiary) for coke (derived from coal) was censured for its un-proportional increase 
                                                
74 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 13 December 
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75 European Commission decision 2003/707/EC (Case COMP/C-1/37.451, 37.578, 37.579 — Deutsche 
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of its upstream prices relative to its downstream prices. This case adopted wording 
similar to that of Commercial Solvents79alluding to the fact that the margin squeeze 
abuse was in fact a form of a refusal to supply as opposed to an independent type of 
abuse. It is submitted that this decision highlights the similarity between the margin 
squeeze cause of action against other generally more recognised causes of action such 
as predatory pricing and refusal to supply. 
In the next EU decision of Napier Brown – British Sugar80 it was found that 
British Sugar was dominant in the upstream market for the supply of raw sugar. 
British Sugar was also confirmed to be vertically integrated and competing in the 
downstream market for derived sugar. It was determined that the prices that British 
Sugar charged itself for raw sugar in comparison to the prices charged to Napier 
Brown, amounted to a pricing strategy aimed at forcing Napier Brown out of the 
downstream market for derived sugar. Much like the National Carbonising case, the 
margin squeeze abuse appears to have been viewed as a subset of a refusal to supply 
as the courts held that Napier Brown’s conduct had fulfilled the criteria set out in 
Commercial Solvents.81 
In the case of Industrie des Poudres Sphériques,82 Pechiney Electrometallugie 
(“PEM”) a company that was the only producer of primary calcium metal (upstream 
input) as well as broken calcium metal (which is derived from primary calcium metal 
and was marketed downstream), was accused of engaging in margin squeeze by 
Industrie des Poudres Sphériques (“IPS”) when it set a high price for primary calcium 
metal and an allegedly low price for broken calcium metal such that IPS (which 
competed with PEM in the downstream market for broken calcium metal) was not 
able to effectively compete with PEM. This claim was nevertheless rejected by the 
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European General Court due to the fact that IPS failed to prove that, amongst other 
aspects, PEM’s pricing policy was abusive.83 
Whereas it is opined that the European position on margin squeeze concept is 
aligned with that of the UK,84 it is also opined that European case law does not offer a 
benchmark definition of a margin squeeze, let alone define it consistently.85 It is only 
in the case of Industrie des Poudres Sphériques that the European Court of first 
instance defined a margin squeeze as follows:  
 
‘[Margin]86 squeezing may be said to take place when an undertaking 
which is in a dominant position on the market for an unprocessed product 
and itself uses part of its production for the manufacture of a more 
processed product, while at the same time selling off surplus unprocessed 
product on the market, sets the price at which it sells the unprocessed 
product at such a level that those who purchase it do not have a sufficient 
profit margin on the processing to remain competitive on the market for 
the processed product.’87 
 
This is noteworthy considering that the definition does not address a number 
of elements considered relevant for establishing a margin squeeze abuse.88 For 
instance, it does not address the requirement that the competing downstream firm 
must be equally efficient as compared to the vertically integrated firm’s downstream 
division. It also does not address the significance of the duration of the margin 
squeeze, nor does it address the fact that a margin squeeze could take place if the 
vertically integrated firm lowered its downstream price.89 It is submitted that this 
definition is nevertheless relevant in that it signifies the first concrete attempt at 
marking out the parameters against which a margin squeeze abuse could be classified. 
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Margin Squeezes have progressively become recognised as an independent abuse in 
Europe. As mentioned above, the abuse falls to be considered under Article 102 
(previously article 82) of the EU Treaty which has found application in a number of 
cases.  
A number of these cases have arisen from the telecommunications sector, such 
as the previously mentioned Deutsche Telekom case90 as well as the Telefonica 
decision91 and TeliaSonera.92  
As mentioned above, in Deutsche Telekom it was held that margin squeeze 
conduct contravenes article 82(a) (now 102(a)) of the EU Treaty. In this matter 
Deutsche Telekom was fined €12.6 million by the European Commission for engaging 
in abusive margin squeeze behaviour with relation to its local networks.93 Deutsche 
Telekom had a dominant position with respect to the ‘local loop’ which comprised the 
final section of the telecommunications network that connects a customer’s premises 
to the local switching point. Deutsche Telekom not only provided downstream retail 
access to the local loop, but also provided wholesale capacity to other competitor 
operators who then also provided downstream retail access in competition with 
Deutsche Telekom. Whereas Deutsche Telekom was obliged since 1998 to provide 
these competitors with access to its networks, the retail and wholesale prices that 
Deutsche Telekom was entitled to impose was subject to regulatory oversight by the 
German telecoms regulator. The Commission indicted Deutsche Telekom for abusing 
its dominant position by charging low retail prices which could have been avoided if 
it had increased its existing retail charges.94 The Commission’s decision was upheld 
on appeal to the General Court95 as well as to the European Court of Justice.96 This 
decision is noteworthy in that it recognised margin squeeze as an independent form of 
abuse,97 bringing much clarity to this aspect of the law (at least within the EU 
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context). It also confirmed the principle that a margin squeeze may occur even when 
the industry in question is regulated.98 
In Telefónica99 (which is similar to Deutsche Telekom in that they both fell 
within the telecommunications sector) Telefónica enjoyed a legal monopoly over the 
Spanish national fixed telephone network before its liberalisation in 1998 and enjoyed 
a dominant position thereafter.100 Telefónica provided broadband at both the retail 
level (i.e. to individuals) as well as wholesale services to other telecommunications 
services providers. Both the Commission as well as the General Court101 confirmed 
that Telefónica had engaged in margin squeeze type conduct due to its unfair prices at 
both retail and wholesale levels at both national and regional level. The General Court 
confirmed the fine of €151 875 000 as imposed by the Commission. 
In the most recent EU decision dealing with margin squeeze abuses of 
Konkurrensverket v TeliaSonera Sverige AB,102 TeliaSonera a telecommunications 
operator in Sweden, much like Deutsche Telekom and Telefónica also enjoyed a 
dominant103 position on the wholesale supply of the fixed telephone network in 
Sweden. The Swedish competition authority on application to Stockholms tingsrätt 
(the Stockholm District Court) alleged that TeliaSonera was guilty of margin squeeze. 
The Stockholm District Court sought clarity from the European Court of Justice (in 
terms of article 267 of the EU Treaty)104 on the circumstances in which the spread 
between the wholesale prices for ADSL on the one hand and the retail prices for 
broadband connection on the other hand may constitute an abuse in terms of Article 
102 of EU Treaty. The European Court of Justice confirmed the criteria for a margin 
squeeze as contemplated in the Deutsche Telekom decision,105 and also emphasised 
that there is a need to show negative effects of anti-competitive pricing practices.106 
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The court also expanded on factors that are generally not relevant when establishing a 
margin squeeze in terms of Article 102 of the EU treaty. These factors are: 
• the absence of a regulatory obligation on the vertically integrated dominant firm to 
supply the wholesale market;107 
• the degree of market dominance;108 
• necessity for dominance at the retail market level;109 
• relevance of whether the supply concerned is to a new customer;110 
• necessity for the dominant undertaking to recoup losses sustained as a result of its 
anti-competitive pricing practices;111 and 
• the relevance of the fact that the markets concerned are growing rapidly and 
involve new technology which require high levels of investment.112 
This finding is of great interest in that it not only solidifies the recognition of 
margin squeeze as a separate cause of action under EU jurisprudence, but that it also 
crystalizes the European position on the assessment of a margin squeeze abuse. 
 
(ii) United Kingdom 
In the United Kingdom (“UK”) margin squeeze abuses have been classified as falling 
under section 18 of the Competition Act113 which relates to abuse of dominance. 
Interestingly, section 18(2) contains wording that resembles the provisions of article 
102(a)) of the EU Treaty. 
In the Genzyme114 decision, which was upheld on appeal to the Competition 
Appeal Tribunal115 it was found that Genzyme had abused its dominant position by 
adopting a pricing policy over the drug Cerezyme (over which Genzyme enjoyed 
dominant supply) which effectively restricted competition in the market for home 
delivery of Cerezyme and provision of homecare services, thereby reserving this 
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market for Genzyme.116 An effects based approach was also adopted in reaching its 
conclusion of abuse of dominance taking the form of a margin squeeze.117 
The courts went further in clarifying the margin squeeze abuse in the decision 
of Albion Water Limited v Dŵr Cymru Cyfyngedig. The decision of the Office of 
Water Affairs of non-infringement118 was overturned by the Competition Appeal 
Tribunal119 which decision was confirmed by the Court of Appeals.120 In confirming 
the existence of a margin squeeze, the Competition Appeal Tribunal considered both 
the ‘equally efficient competitor test’ as well as the ‘reasonably efficient competitor 
test’ and confirmed its preference for the former despite the fact that the later test 
remains recognised.121 This is of relevance as it clarifies the UK approach to 
determining the economic effects of a margin squeeze. 
 
(iii) United States of America 
The US is somewhat different from the UK and EU systems for a number of reasons 
including that the applicable legislation (i.e. section 2 of the Sherman Act)122 does not 
specifically deal with abuse of dominance abuses. The judiciary has had to set 
precedent in this regard.123 
The US has relatively recently adopted a new approach to its handling of 
margin squeeze cases. By way of a background, in Alcoa124 a 1945 decision, Alcoa a 
vertically integrated firm with an upstream monopoly in the supply of virgin 
aluminium ingot was held to be charging a price higher than a ‘fair price’ for its 
upstream product, thereby suggesting that its practices were exclusionary.125 This was 
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123 Parr op cit note 77 at 3; see also Kelly & van der Vijver op cit note 10 at 252. 
124 United States v Aluminum Co of America et al 1945 case number 148 F.2d 416 (Circuit Court of 
Appeals, Second Circuit). 





however eventually overturned in the Linkline case126 in which it was determined that 
margin squeezes127 should be dealt with either as predation as contemplated in Brooke 
Group128 or as a constructive refusal to supply as contemplated in Aspen Skiing.129 
Linkline refers to the decision of Trinko,130 a decision that had already narrowed down 
the margin squeeze criteria contemplated in Aspen Skiing.131 In Trinko Justice Scalia 
referring to the Colgate132 case confirmed that the Sherman Act does not create an 
obligation to trade or deal, and that a private enterprise may freely exercise its 
discretion as to whom to interact with where there is no such duty.133 
Clearly, by rejecting the margin squeeze principle, the US courts have moved 
in the opposite direction of the European and UK courts. The question now remains 
which approach South Africa will adopt, particularly as it has the advantage of being 
able to observe the application of the margin squeeze concept in various jurisdictions. 
 
(iv) Australia 
A margin squeeze abuse is also recognised in Australian jurisprudence and has been 
prosecuted in terms of section 46 of the Australian Competition and Consumer Act.134 
As in most jurisdictions, the margin squeeze abuse is classified as an abuse of 
dominance abuse, and has been adjudicated in a number of cases135 notably none of 
which are recent.  
It is generally understood that although a vertically integrated firm with 
upstream market power is entitled to act in its own self-interest, such a firm is not 
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precluded from taking precautions against harming a markets competitive processes 
that have already been destabilised by the firm’s dominance.136 This view is supported 
by the judgment of Pont Data137 in which it was confirmed that a firm in a dominant 
position could not simply refuse to supply an essential upstream input.138 One can 
therefore assert that Australian competition law jurisprudence has adopted an 
approach aimed at protecting market processes as opposed to one aimed at directly 
protecting consumer interest. It is arguable that this approach differs somewhat with 
the approach contemplated in the Competition Act which envisages a balance 
between consumer and market interests.139 
 
(v) Canada 
Canadian competition law explicitly recognises margin squeeze in section 78(1)(a) of 
the Canadian Competition Act140 as an anti-competitive act constituting an abuse of 
dominance in terms of section 79 of the same act. This clarity and certainty does not 
however, automatically translate into ease of application and use of the principle. For 
instance, whereas the Enforcement Guidelines on the Abuse of Dominance Provisions 
on sections 78 and 79 of the Competition Act141 provide some insight into the 
application of these sections, the guidance provided is superficial meaning that 
guidance would have to be obtained from case law. Unfortunately however, margin 
squeezes allegations have thus far been few and far between in Canada implying that 
the body of case law applicable (if any, due to a number of investigations of these 
complaints having been discontinued due to a lack of evidence)142 will simply not be 
sufficient to provide the required guidance. 
Canada’s Competition Bureau has adopted a logical approach when reviewing 
margin squeeze abuse decisions by inter alia classifying conduct that could be 
categorised as an abuse of dominance as a margin squeeze, except when the conduct 
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complained of results in a lowering in prices at the retail level only in which event the 







I. BACKGROUND TO THE SENWES CASES 
With the fundamentals in place, it is now possible to discuss the Senwes matter, 
starting with a brief factual background. As mentioned above,143 margin squeeze 
cases tend to arise in newly liberalized markets, such as with the liberalization of the 
market for the storage of grain, which gave rise (in part) to the Senwes matter. 
Established in 1909144 Senwes existed as a co-operative for approximately 88 
years before being converted into a public company in 1997.145 Senwes provides a 
number of services including the provision of input products for agricultural 
production, market access for grain produce as well as financial, technical and 
logistical services to grain producers.146 For purposes of the case (and this 
dissertation), the business in question relates to it being a silo owner and by virtue 
thereof, storing grain for itself and for third parties. It also markets and trades in 
grain.147 
Senwes’ concrete silos (“silos”) are located primarily in the Free State, but are 
also located in the Northwest, Gauteng and the Northern Cape provinces. It was 
common cause that each silo constituted a local grain storage market for a radius of 
approximately 60 kilometers. Cumulatively, the areas in which the silos were located 
(of which Senwes owns 56 out of the 80 silos) were referred to as the ‘Senwes 
area’.148 
The silos were built between the mid 1960s and 1980s. During this period, grain 
co-operatives enjoyed a unique role in respect of the storage, handling and marketing 
of large quantities of grain which was largely attributable to their appointment as 
agents of the Maize Board.149 The Co-operatives Act prohibited co-operatives from 
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competing against one another.150 This led to their being only one silo in a particular 
region, in most cases owned by a co-operative.151 
All this changed in 1995 when the regulatory framework governing the trade in 
grain changed.152 In 1997, Senwes was converted from a co-operative into a public 
company ostensibly in response to the change in the regulatory framework. Grain 
production was no longer subject to a centralised system of planning nor were farmers 
obliged to sell their product to the Maize Board at a regulated price. Instead, grain 
was traded as a commodity on the South African Futures Exchange (“Safex”).153 
Whereas farms and trade in grain are now subject to market forces, silos remained 
unaffected by these forces. Senwes was fortunate in that the silos retained a monopoly 
in their respective areas for two reasons: firstly, because they are significantly 
expensive to construct and secondly, because the silos were rarely at full capacity, 
resulting in little if no demand for additional silos.154 
The ability to trade grain on Safex plays an important role in the Senwes case. 
Although the physical trade in grain continued to take place, trade in grain through the 
Safex forum became the primary place through which trade in grain took place (it was 
estimated that trade in grain on Safex exceeded the trade in physical grain by a factor 
of eight).155 This also means that a large proportion of traders of grain in Safex are 
only involved in trading in grain as a commodity through Safex and not in the 
physical trade in grain.156 This is of significance because silo owners (Senwes being 
one of them) are also major players in the trade of grain in Safex, so much so that it 
was alledged that Senwes’ trading strategy informed its storage policy.157 
The significance of silo owners being involved in trading grain via the Safex 
market becomes apparent when one examines the manner in which prices in this 
market are determined. Market forces determine the prices at which grain is traded on 
Safex. This does not mean however, that the price of grain on Safex is the actual price 
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of grain at the ‘farm’ level. In order for grain to be traded on Safex, it is practice for 
the prices of grain to include a set (non-binding) tariff for storage and transport inputs. 
This is done in order to standardize the costs of these inputs.158 
Traders will use the Safex price for a particular day when purchasing grain from 
farmers. The traders will deduct from the Safex price the handling, transport and 
storage tariffs and also the trader’s commission. Where a trader can offer a farmer a 
saving on one of the tariffs (for instance, if the cost of transportation is lower than the 
tariff rate), then the trader will pass on the savings to the farmer in order to influence a 
sale. The difference between the actual cost and the cost reflected in the tariff is 
referred to as the Safex premium.159 
Another factor worth mentioning is the effect that the seasonality of maize (which 
constitutes 80% of the grain stored in silos) has on the grain price. Because maize is 
planted from October to December, and is typically harvested from June to August the 
demand and supply of maize has a noteworthy effect on the price throughout the 
various seasons. Prices are lowest during the harvest period (due to increased supply) 
and progressively rise as supply decreases. Farmers will therefore spread the outflow 
of their product supply in such a manner as to obtain cash flow at the beginning of the 
harvest season, but also enjoy higher prices later on.160 
The farmers will either sell their grain to traders (Senwes being one of them) or 
will cut out the ‘middleman’ and sell directly to millers. However, millers prefer to 
purchase grain from silos (for reasons such as quality control, their limited storage 
capacity and in order to take advantage of fluctuation in market prices). This means 
that a large portion of a grain harvest will have to be stored at either the farmers or 
traders expense.161 
Grain is only capable of being traded on Safex by way of a negotiable instrument 
referred to as a silo certificate. This certificate is obtained when a farmer delivers 100 
tons of a product (which has been graded and stored according to its grade) at a silo. 
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Note that the farmer need not deliver 100 tons of grain in one go, but may do so over 
a period of time until the threshold is met.162 
Senwes had historically charged at the beginning of each annual seasonal cycle, a 
daily rate for storage which is caped at 100 days. There would be no additional charge 
from day 101 until the end of the season. The daily rate was charged again once a new 
season begins. This practice was applied to any storage customer irrespective of 
whether they were a farmer or trader.163 
This practice changed in May 2003 when Senwes ceased to apply the capped tariff 
principle to traders, retaining it only for farmer customers. This new tariff, referred to 
as a ‘differential tariff’ resulted in traders paying daily rates even after the 100 days, 
effectively increasing their cost of storage after that period. Farmers who opted to 
obtain silo certificates were also deemed to be traders, and were also charged the 
differential tariff. Senwes conceded that it treated its own storage unit differently, and 
did not lead any evidence to suggest that it had any internal storage cost recovery.164 It 
was alleged by the Competition Commission that it was around this time that Senwes 
informed farmers that Senwes would be able to offer the farmers a better price for 
their produce because Senwes would either not charge them for storage or offer a 
reduced price for storage. In contrast, traders would have to deduct from their offer to 
a farmer the costs of storage (including the new cost of the differential tariff).165 
 
II. SENWES BEFORE THE COURTS 
With the above background in mind, one can now examine briefly the manner in 
which the different South African courts adjudicated the case in its various stages, 
with an emphasis on their findings in respect of the margin squeeze abuse.166 
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(a) The Competition Tribunal 
The Competition Tribunal addressed the charges against Senwes as constituting two 
forms of abuse: an ‘inducement’ abuse and a ‘margin squeeze’ abuse.167 The 
inducement abuse arose as a result of the allegations that Senwes constructively 
induced farmers not to deal with traders due to increased storage costs. The margin 
squeeze abuse arose as a result of the application of the differential tariff           by 
Senwes (a vertically integrated firm) to its downstream competitors in such a manner 
as to reduce the ability of its downstream rivals to earn a viable price cost margin.168  
 The Competition Tribunal concluded that Senwes contravened the provisions 
of section 8(d)(i) from a conduct point of view169 but not from an anti-competitive 
effect point of view,170 and reached a similar conclusion in respect of the margin 
squeeze conduct allegations. The Competition Tribunal confirmed that the Senwes’ 
conduct amounted to an exclusionary act by a dominant firm in the form of a margin 
squeeze. This was because it had the effect of limiting the ability of Senwes’ 
downstream rivals from competing with its own downstream operation.171 It was also 
confirmed that the margin squeeze would be classified as conduct falling under 
section 8(c) of the Competition Act.172  
It is important to note that throughout the proceedings of the Competition 
Tribunal, Senwes pointed out that the Competition Commission did not plead a case 
for margin squeeze from the outset. Senwes therefore argued that it did not have to 
answer these charges as it was not permissible for the Competition Commission to 
change its case without formally applying to amend its pleadings.173 It was held by the 
Competition Tribunal that the amendment of the Competition Commission’s case to 
include the margin squeeze case was not a major departure from the pleadings with 
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the result that Senwes would not have been prejudiced by its introduction.174 It was 
also held that to allow Senwes to succeed on a technical defence would be 
significantly unfair for both the Competition Commission and the competitive 
markets that the Competition Commission represents.175 
 
(b) Competition Appeal Court of South Africa 
Senwes appealed to the Competition Appeal Court176 on the basis that the Competition 
Commission had not pleaded the margin squeeze case properly, that the Competition 
Commission had failed to lead evidence in support of a margin squeeze allegation and 
that there was no basis for the importation of the margin squeeze concept in South 
African law.  
The Competition Appeal Court responded to each of the allegations. In respect of 
the first allegation, it concluded that the Competition Act envisaged a flexible forum 
allowing a more robust approach towards its adjudicative proceedings, in effect 
allowing for the manner in which the Competition Commission introduced the margin 
squeeze case.  In respect of the second allegation it also held that the case was set out 
with sufficient clarity as to allow Senwes to prepare an appropriate defence.177 
Finally, the Competition Appeal Court rejected Senwes’ reliance on arguments 
against the utility of the margin squeeze concept on the basis of arguments derived 
from US jurisprudence. Instead it concluded that the Competition Commission’s 
reliance on the open ended provisions of section 8(c) of the Competition Act was well 
founded.178 The appeal was accordingly dismissed. 
 
(c) Supreme Court of Appeal 
Although leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal was denied by the 
Competition Appeal Court179 leave to appeal was granted by the Supreme Court of 
Appeal.180 The appeal was ultimately upheld on the basis that the Competition 
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Tribunal, being a creature of statue is restricted to arguments raised in a referral. This 
was in summary, based on Senwes’ consistent stance that the margin squeeze case 
was improperly raised as well as the Competition Tribunals reluctance to formally 
amend its pleadings.181  
 
(d) Constitutional Court 
The Competition Commission appealed the Supreme Court of Appeal decision, and 
leave to appeal was granted by the Constitutional Court. The grounds on which it was 
granted was that it was a constitutional issue and in the interests of justice to 
determine whether the Competition Tribunal exceeded its statutory power and 
violated the principle of legality when adjudicating the Senwes margin squeeze abuse 
case.182 
In the main judgement, the Constitutional Court held that the Supreme Court of 
Appeal erred in concluding that the Competition Tribunal had considered a complaint 
that was not dealt with in the referral. The Constitutional Court held that the 
complaint relating to the contravention of section 8(c) of the Competition Act, 
addressed the essential elements of the section. In other words, the mistake made by 
the Competition Tribunal was not one of law, but of placing the label of ‘margin 
squeeze’ on its allegations.183 This was supported by the fact that the evidence clearly 
showed that Senwes did in fact contravene the provisions of section 8(c) of the 
Competition Act.184 The appeal was accordingly upheld, with the unique order 
requiring that the reference to margin squeeze be deleted.185 
The minority judgement focused instead on the functions of the Competition 
Tribunal, and opined that the appropriate remedy would be to refer the matter back to 
the Competition Tribunal in order to determine the appropriate ambit for the referral. 
The hearing would then be able to proceed on the basis of that ruling.186 
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(e) Order Confirming Settlement Agreement Between The Competition Commission 
And Senwes 
Following the ruling of the Constitutional Court the Commission and Senwes reached 
settlement on the remedies in terms of a Settlement Agreement which was thereafter 
confirmed and made an order of the Competition Tribunal in terms of section 58(1)(a) 
and 58(1)(b) of the Competition Act.187 Interestingly, the salient terms of the 
settlement agreement largely mirrored the remedies sought by the Competition 
Commission in its pleadings.188  
The Competition Commission and Senwes agreed that the remaining part of 
Senwes’ grain marketing business would be transferred to a separate legal entity 
(referred to as “Newco”) by either 31 May 2014 or a day falling nine months after 
confirmation of the settlement agreement.189 This allowed Senwes more time to 
execute the operational aspects required to transfer the business when compared to the 
90 day transfer period contemplated in the remedies sought by the Competition 
Commission.190 The underlying reason for the transfer is firstly to ensure operational 
independence of Senwes’ grain trading business and its storage business and secondly 
to ensure that Senwes’ grain trading business is treated equally to other traders in 
respect of storage. This independence would be additionally entrenched by the 
requirement for separate board of directors comprising non-executive directors not 
affiliated to Senwes as well separate employee incentive schemes.191 
Senwes will also be entitled to retain a grain procurement arm alongside but 
distinct from its silo business. The grain procurement arm will be entitled to contract 
with any grain trader including Newco provided that this is done on an arm’s length 
basis. It would also be required to pay the standard storage and handling rates offered 
on identical terms to all who store grain with it,192 and would additionally be required 
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to retain separate accounts so as to enable the monitoring of its compliance with the 
conditions of the Settlement Agreement.193 
The Settlement Agreement effectively introduces mechanisms aimed at 
circumscribing Senwes’ ability to leverage its upstream dominance of its grain storage 
division against its downstream rivals engaged in the trading of grain. Compliance 
with the terms of the Settlement Agreement is to be monitored and confirmed in 
writing by Senwes with compulsory verification by external auditors for the first five 
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I. STATUS OF MARGIN SQUEEZE AS A SOUTH AFRICAN COMPETITION 
LAW PRINCIPLE 
As a precursor to delving into the intricacies of the margin squeeze concept as 
understood in South African competition law jurisprudence, and with a background of 
the approach to cases of margin squeeze abuses in foreign jurisdictions, it is important 
to determine whether it is in fact recognised as a viable course of action by our courts. 
As stated above, the Competition Tribunal found that the complaint in respect of a 
margin squeeze had been established as a contravention of 8(c) of the Competition 
Act.195 This finding was confirmed when the matter was appealed to the Competition 
Appeal Court.196 
Following the granting of leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal of 
South Africa, this court upheld the appeal and dismissed the Competition Tribunal’s 
finding on the basis that it had exceeded its powers by failing to seek an amendment 
to the Tribunal’s referral in respect of the margin squeeze allegations.197 
The Constitutional Court reversed the finding of the Supreme Court of Appeal. It 
did so by finding that:198 
• the Constitutional Court was satisfied that Senwes had engaged in an exclusionary 
act as contemplated in section 8(c) of the Competition Act. This was supported by 
the evidence on record; 
• the complaint submitted by the Competition Tribunal did not refer to a margin 
squeeze, nor did section 8(c) of the Competition Act use the term; and 
• despite the Competition Tribunal’s error of failing to refer to a margin squeeze in 
its referral, conduct amounting to a contravention of section 8(c) of the 
Competition Act had been established. This therefore fell within the ambit of the 
Competition Tribunal’s referral. 
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It was accordingly concluded that the Competition Tribunal’s ruling was upheld, 
save that all references to margin squeeze be deleted.199  
It is submitted that the effect of this judgment does not do away with the concept 
of margin squeeze. Instead, it allows for the principles of a margin squeeze to live 
within the confines of a section 8(c) contravention, but simply without the label.  
The Constitutional Court’s reasoning cannot be faulted particularly when 
considering that the substance of the Competition Tribunal’s findings were based on 
ensuring that the Competition Commission’s allegations properly satisfied the 
provisions of section 8(c) of the Competition Act200 as opposed to merely making out 
a case for margin squeeze in isolation. This decision is nevertheless unusual and 
artificial in that it does not do away with the substance and applicability of the margin 
squeeze principle in South African jurisprudence to the extent that it falls within the 
confines of Section 8(c) of the Competition Act. In this respect it is submitted that it 
was unnecessary to do away with the label of ‘margin squeeze’ as the label does not 
of itself carry any weight in the adjudication of margin squeeze cases. It is opined that 
there is nothing preventing future decisions from continuing to utilise the margin 
squeeze label or classification, even if for the sake of convenience alone. 
For the sake of continuity, this assignment will continue to use the label ‘margin 
squeeze’ in relation to the margin squeeze concept. 
 
II. ELEMENTS OF A MARGIN SQUEEZE 
It is necessary to conduct an in-depth analysis of the Competition Tribunal decision, 
in relation to the manner in which it addressed the margin squeeze principle. This 
analysis is required for at least two reasons: first, the Constitutional Court upheld the 
decision of the Competition Tribunal, thereby elevating the significance of the 
decision. Secondly, and flowing directly from the first conclusion, the decision will 
now stand as the platform against which future cases will be tested. It is therefore 
important to have a clear understanding of the parameters and potential challenges 
within which future ‘margin squeeze’ cases will be raised. 
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It is submitted that there are, in broad terms, two sets of elements that will need to 
be satisfied in order to succeed with a margin squeeze case. The first set of elements 
relates to compliance with section 8(c). The second set of elements being the margin 
squeeze elements, emanate from one of the elements required for compliance with 
section 8(c) that being the nature of the exclusionary act of a vertically integrated 
firm. 
 
(a) Section 8(c) elements 
Section 8(c) of the Competition Act provides that, 
‘8. It is prohibited for a dominant, firm to 
… 
(c) engage in an exclusionary act, other than an act listed in paragraph 
(d), if the anti-competitive effect of that act outweighs its technological, 
efficiency or other pro-competitive, gain.’ 
Whereas the constitutional Court stipulates that three elements need to be met in 
order to establish that an abuse of dominance has occurred201 it is submitted that there 
are in fact four elements that need to be satisfied. The first element which the court 
did not refer to as an element, requires that the firm be a dominant firm. Secondly, the 
dominant firm must engage in an exclusionary act. Thirdly, the exclusionary act must 
not be one listed in section 8(d) and fourthly, the anti-competitive effect of the act 
must outweigh its technological, efficiency and other pro-competitive gains.202 These 
elements will now be dealt with in more detail. 
 
(i) Dominance 
Proof of dominance is a well established principle both locally and internationally.203 
The principles and law relating to abuse of dominance as well as market power in 
their general application have been dealt with in Chapter 2 in detail. 
When interpreting dominance in the South African context of a margin squeeze 
complaint, the general approach as has been interpreted by the South African courts 
will apply. The approach involves defining the relevant market, calculating the 
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entities market share and determination of the entities market power.204 In essence, the 
purpose of this approach is to ascertain the entities ability to prevent effective 
competition, to behave independently of its competition and its ability to control 
prices or exclude competition.205 
With reference to the Senwes decisions, Senwes’ market share for the storage of 
grain was confirmed to be over 80% in the Senwes area,206 thereby exceeding the 
threshold contemplated in section 7(a) of the Competition Act. Senwes did not dispute 
its dominance and in fact, conceded its position in its pleadings.207 It is interesting to 
note that the Competition Tribunal did not make mention of its intention to attach any 
weight to the extent of Senwes’ market power. In as much as it is unlikely that South 
African competition law jurisprudence will adopt the concept of ‘super dominance’ – 
a term used in European jurisprudence to describe a position of significant dominance 
– it could, as discussed in TeliaSonera,208 be taken into consideration when assessing 
the effects of the dominant undertakings activities. 
It was also established both in the Senwes Competition Tribunal decisions as well 
as in the Genzyme decision that a vertically integrated firm need not be dominant in 
both the upstream and downstream markets i.e. it is sufficient if it is dominant in the 
upstream market alone.209 South African competition authorities have in fact 
concluded that it is possible to commit an abuse of dominance offense even though 
the effects are experienced in a different market.210 This view was confirmed by the 
Competition Tribunal i.e. that a firm may be dominant in one market but have its 
effects felt in an ‘adjacent’ market.211 
The Competition Tribunal differentiated between the two markets in which 
Senwes had a presence. It differentiated between the upstream market for grain 
storage212 and the downstream market for trading.213 On the evidence provided the 
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tribunal came to an uncontested finding that Senwes had a market share of over 80% 
in the Senwes area, resulting in Senwes being deemed to have dominance in terms of 
section 7(a).214 In respect of the downstream market, although there was some debate 
regarding the definition of the downstream market, the Competition Tribunal 
importantly concluded that proving dominance on the downstream level is not 
necessary.215 Of relevance is the fact that Senwes leveraged its upstream dominance 
to enable its exclusionary strategy. 
  
(ii) Exclusionary Act 
As discussed in Chapter 2 above, an exclusionary act is defined in section 1 of the 
Competition Act as behaviour that impedes or prevents a firm from entering into or 
expanding within a market. It casts a wide net for exclusionary acts such that those 
acts that do not fall under section 8(d), could be accounted for by this provision.216 
The behaviour in question must be exclusionary in nature in contradistinction to acts 
that directly exploit consumers.217 
The Competition Commission has provided guidance as to the manner in which 
exclusionary acts are to be approached. In Competition Commission v South African 
Airways (Pty) Ltd218 it was held that: 
‘In summary, we find that the Competition Act sets out the following 
approach to exclusionary practices. In the first place we examine whether 
the conduct in question is exclusionary in nature. In terms of section 8(c) 
that would be conduct that fits the definition in the Act for what constitutes 
an exclusionary act. In terms of 8(d) it is conduct that meets the definitions 
set out in the sub-paragraphs of that section. If the conduct meets the 
requirements of the definition, we then enquire whether the exclusionary 
act has an anti-competitive effect. This question will be answered in the 
affirmative if there is (i) evidence of actual harm to consumer welfare or 
(ii) if the exclusionary act is substantial or significant in terms of its effect 
in foreclosing the market to rivals. This latter conclusion is partly factual 
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and partly based on reasonable inferences drawn from proven facts. If the 
answer to that question is yes, we conclude that the conduct will have an 
anti-competitive effect. Whichever species of anticompetitive effect we 
have, consumer welfare or likely foreclosure, we have evidence of a 
quantitative nature and hence we can return to the scales with a concept 
capable of being measured against the alleged efficiency gain.’ 
The above definition reduces the enquiry to a two step process being (a) that the 
conduct must be exclusionary, i.e. one that impedes or prevents a firm from entering 
into or expanding within a market and (b) whose anti competitive effect is measured 
by actual harm to consumer welfare or the significance of its effect in excluding 
competition in a market. 
The first part of the enquiry constitutes the essential difference between sections 
8(c) and 8(d). As mentioned above, whereas section 8(d) lists five exclusionary types 
of conduct, section 8(c) is designed to allow for exclusionary conduct that may not 
fall under the conduct set out in section 8(d). The type of conduct that would fall 
under section 8(c) is not limited, but would in most cases resemble the type of 
conduct listed in section 8(d).219  
The exclusionary criteria was extended relatively recently in the case of 
Competition Commission and Another v British American Tobacco South Africa (Pty) 
Ltd by providing that ‘significant foreclosure’ is required for there to be an 
‘exclusionary act’.220 This has however been criticised as not only being in direct 
conflict with principles set out in Competition Commission v South African Airways 
(Pty) Ltd221 but that it also combines (inadvertently and erroneously) two distinct 
stages in proving a section 8(c) abuse i.e. proof of an exclusionary act and proof of an 
anti-competitive effect.222 
The Competition Commission found that Senwes’ margin squeeze conduct 
amounted to an exclusionary act as it had the effect of impeding and preventing its 
downstream competitors from competing with its own downstream undertaking.223 In 
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particular, this arose due to the rise in costs for traders in the post one hundred day 
period in the Senwes area.224 
The second part of the enquiry can be interpreted to mean that ‘actual harm’ to 
consumer welfare need not be proven if it can be shown that the exclusionary act is 
substantial or significant enough to foreclose the market.225 
The Competition Commission elaborated on four sets of evidence in establishing 
that Senwes’ exclusionary acts were substantial or significant enough to foreclose the 
market.226 First, it described evidence from traders about how the denial of the one 
hundred day cap to them resulted in a change in their trading patterns in the Senwes 
area. Secondly, it showed that there was an increase in the percentage of grain held by 
Senwes showing that this increase was at the expense of the traders.227 Thirdly, it led 
evidence of two tenders that Senwes had won primarily because of the effects that the 
margin squeeze had on its downstream competitors.228 Fourthly, evidence was led 
showing that Senwes won more tenders post the one hundred day cap, than it had 
previously.229 The Competition Commission’s case was not limited to foreclosure, but 
extended to include evidence of the harm that the margin squeeze had to consumer 
welfare. In this respect, evidence was led which showed that the margin squeeze had 
an effect on farmers as well as on mill door contract prices.230 On the basis of this 
evidence, the Competition Commission concluded that the differential tariff imposed 
by Senwes had an effect of foreclosing the market as well as a harmful effect to 
consumer welfare.231 
A challenge that one faces with the interpretation of section 8(c), is that all 
competition is by definition exclusionary.232 It is therefore somewhat artificial to 
assume that all other types of abuses that are not classified under 8(c) or 8(d) are not 
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exclusionary. To counter this, one would have to apply a balancing test in order to 
distinguish between that which is pro-competitive and anti-competitive.233 
It is important to note that the exclusionary element is the element through which 
the margin squeeze principles find application in the Competition law dispensation. 
To date, it is only the Senwes decision(s) that have made a finding in respect of 
section 8(c).234 
 
(iii) Exclusionary Act Outside of Section 8(d) 
Under section 8(d), five acts are described as being exclusionary. These are (1) 
inducing a supplier or customer not to deal; (2) refusing to supply scarce goods to a 
customer when it is commercially feasible to do so; (3) selling a product on condition 
that separate goods, services or conditions unrelated to the product are purchased; (4) 
selling products below their marginal or average variable cost; or (5) buying up scarce 
or intermediate goods required by a competitor. It is therefore necessary as part of the 
enquiry to determine whether an abuse falls under section 8(d), to rule out the 
application of 8(c). 
As mentioned above, this is a challenging exercise as all competitive conduct is 
inherently exclusionary.235 This means that all conduct that falls under section 8(d) 
will in most if not all instances fall and section 8(c), and that some instances which 
should be classified under section 8(c) proper, may just as easily be classified under 
section 8(d).  
The Competition Tribunal went through pains in determining whether a margin 
squeeze should best be classified under section 8(c) or 8(d)(i) as an inducement abuse. 
In this respect, it concluded that whereas inducement under section 8(d)(i) constitutes 
the process of enticing or persuading a customer not to engage a competitor a margin 
squeeze does not require such persuasion or enticement.236 It thereafter made a half-
hearted attempt at determining whether the conduct fell foul of section 8(d)(iii) as a 
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tying and bundling abuse and concluded that there was no evidence that Senwes had 
tied or bundled storage with trading.237  
It should be noted however, that section 8(c) requires that the exclusionary act 
should not fall foul of any of the provisions listed in section 8(d). It is submitted that 
the Competition Tribunal was required to conduct its enquiry into every provision of 
section 8(d). Instead it only conducted its enquiry into those provisions prosecuted by 
the Competition Commission i.e. sections 8(d)(i) and 8(d)(iii). This is not to say that 
the Competition Tribunal failed to confirm that the Senwes’ alleged conduct did not 
fall foul of all of the provisions section 8(d),238 however, it is clear that the 
Competition Tribunal did not provide justification for its conclusion that remaining 
provisions of section 8(d) were not applicable i.e. sections 8(d)(ii) relating to refusal 
to supply, 8(d)(iv) dealing with selling products below their marginal or average 
variable cost, or 8(d)(v) dealing with buying up scarce or intermediate goods required 
by a competitor. 
It is submitted that future decisions will need to conduct a reasonable enquiry into 
all the provisions of section 8(d), and in particular the provisions of section 8(d)(ii). 
This is because there is cause to believe that this provision could potentially house a 
margin squeeze abuse claim if it can be shown that the upstream product is in fact 
scarce, and that the exclusionary pricing practices adopted by the offending firm 
amounts to a constructive refusal.239 
 
(iv) Objective Justification 
In terms of section 8(c), when it has been established that a firm has engaged in 
exclusionary conduct, it can only be found to have contravened the section if the anti-
competitive effect of the conduct outweighs its “…technological, efficiency or other 
pro-competitive gain”. For the sake of brevity and in order to be aligned with the 
language of the Competition Tribunal, this dissertation will refer to this phrase as 
‘objective justification’. 240 
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The analysis of the objective justification element actually requires an 
understanding of two elements, the first being that the term/phrase ‘anti-competitive 
effect’ needs to be unpacked. Secondly, the criteria for the ‘technological, efficiency 
or other pro-competitive gain’ aspect needs to be analysed. 
In relation to understanding the anti-competitive aspect, it is relevant to note 
that the Competition Act does not define the term.241 It has however been opined that 
anti-competitive conduct is merely behaviour which is what “a particular community 
regards as undesirable behaviour in the context of commercial competition, and that 
which is undesirable varies from community to community”.242 
Three conclusions may however be reached regarding the meaning of anti-
competitive effects in the context of South African law.243 First, the injury or unfair 
treatment of a competitor is not sufficient to be classified as an ‘anti-competitive 
effect’,244 secondly, proof that consumer welfare has been affected or harmed is 
adequate for purposes of establishing an anti-competitive effect 245 and thirdly, the 
significant or substantial foreclosure to a dominant firm’s competitors will create the 
inference of an anti-competitive effect.246 Little has been done to expand on these 
broad and somewhat vague principles,247 meaning that these principles will need to be 
refined by judicial scrutiny over time. 
One then needs to understand the meaning of technological, efficiency or other 
pro-competitive gains. This is important because even if it is established that certain 
conduct results in an anti-competitive effect, it may still be established that there are 
technological, efficiency or other pro-competitive gains that justify such an effect.248 
Examples of these gains include reduced transaction costs, the servicing of previously 
un-serviced customers and economies of scale.249 It is however necessary that the pro-
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competitive effects and/or gains (efficiencies) are the direct results of the conduct 
being investigated i.e. without the conduct, the gains would not exist.250 
The distinction between sections 8(c) and 8(d) also plays a role in the 
determination of technological, efficiency or other pro-competitive gains. Whereas 
section 8(c) places the onus to prove this element on the complainant, section 8(d) 
places the onus on the accused.251 The Competition Tribunal showed that this does not 
mean that the dominant firm is absent of any requirement to show that the outcome of 
its conduct is objectively justifiable. On the contrary, the Competition Tribunal 
asserted that there is an expectation on respondents that have an objective justification 
to plead this point.252 This is because it would be difficult for the complainant to 
comprehensively conceive of all the defences that the accused firm would raise as 
objective justifications and prepare responses to these hypothetical reasons. This 
would be impractical and unreasonable. Instead, if the accused fails to raise any 
objective justifications, then the complainant will be deemed to have shown that the 
anti-competitive conduct’s effect has superseded its pro-competitive gains.253 
In respect of the margin squeeze allegations, Senwes did not raise any formal 
justification for the difference in tariffs between non-traders and traders post one 
hundred days.254 Senwes did however attempt to raise two defences during the course 
of the proceedings. The first was raised during cross examination in which it 
attempted to show that the differential tariff was raised due to the willingness of 
different categories to pay i.e. that traders could potentially have been willing to pay 
more.255 The second and more complicated defence was one based on what was 
termed ‘selecting against’. The Competition Tribunal did not consider this a pro-
competitive justification for the conduct.256 
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(v) Additional Considerations for 8(c) 
A few additional factors should be taken into consideration when applying section 
8(c). 
1. Administrative Penalty 
The Competition Tribunal cannot impose an administrative penalty or fine for a first 
time contravention of section 8(c). An administrative penalty or fine can only be 
imposed if a dominant firm repeats conduct that had previously been found to have 
contravened section 8(c).257 
 
2. Proof of Intention 
There are conflicting views regarding whether or not intention is required when 
investigating an abuse of dominance under section 8(c) (or 8(d) for that matter). On 
the one hand it has been posited that it is necessary to establish that a dominant firm 
had an intention to impede or prevent a firm from entering into or expanding within a 
market.258 The contrary view is held that neither intention nor proof of a dominant 
firm’s aim is required or is sufficient to establish a claim under section 8(c).259 This 
does not mean however that proof of a firm’s intention or aim would be disregarded; 
on the contrary, it may very well strengthen a claim.260 
Section 8(c) does not mention the requirement for intention. It is on this basis that 
it is submitted that the second view (i.e. that intention is not a requirement) is 
supported. Although Article 102 of the EC Treaty is similarly quiet on the 
requirement of intention, this has not stopped the European case law from featuring 
this element as part of an Article 102 enquiry.261 Our courts should avoid making a 
similar error (particularly if relying on European case law)262 and should instead limit 
the utility of an allegation of intention to that of a supportive role. 
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3. Proof of Harm 
Abuse of dominance under section 8(c) does not require that a third party be harmed 
by this abuse. Similarly, a dominant firm cannot be absolved of liability for a breach 
of this provision on the basis that it obtained the consent or waiver of the affected 
third party.263 Instead, the conduct is de facto prohibited. 
 
(b) Margin Squeeze Elements: the Senwes Competition Tribunal Criteria 
In conjunction with satisfying the requirements of section 8(c), the Competition 
Tribunal set out additional criteria against which a case for margin squeeze is based. 
These conditions are based on the work of O’Donogue and Padilla. 264 Although 
mentioned above, they are reproduced below for convenience: 
• the supplier of the input (or the dominant firm) is vertically integrated; 
• the input is essential for downstream competition; 
• the vertically integrated firm’s prices would render the activities of an efficient 
rival uneconomic; and 
• there is no objective justification for the vertically integrated firms pricing 
strategy. 
Each of these elements will be discussed in greater detail below 
 
(i) Vertical Integration 
As mentioned above, a vertically integrated firm is one which is dominant or controls 
the supply of products in the upstream market and simultaneously participates in a 
competitive market downstream market.265 Because of its dominance in the upstream 
market, the vertically integrated firm will be able to influence the price it charges at 
the upstream and/or downstream level so as to impede the downstream firm’s ability 
to cover its costs.266 
The fact that Senwes was vertically integrated was not contested and was 
considered common cause.267 Unfortunately the Competition Tribunal failed to 
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elaborate on this test or to provide criteria against which future cases can be 
measured. 
 
(ii) Essential Input 
Storage in concrete grain silos was confirmed to be an essential input to traders in the 
trading market.268 In reaching this conclusion, the Competition Tribunal looked at an 
alterative to the concrete silo, being the silo bag.269 It concluded however, that silo 
bags were not a realistic option due to for instance suspicions of the quality of grain in 
the silo bag, as well as the fact that a silo certificate (a prerequisite for trading on 
Safex) could not be issued if grain was stored in a silo bag.270 It is submitted that it 
can be inferred from the Competition Tribunal’s conclusion, that an analysis of the 
alternatives of a particular input as well as their practicality and availability is 
required when determining whether a particular input is in fact essential. 
There are however a number of aspects that the Competition Tribunal failed to 
elaborate on with respect to this test, which would assist in establishing the criteria 
against which future cases can be measured.271 These criteria include determining that 
the essential nature of the upstream product needs to satisfy two conditions i.e. the 
input needs to be essential both to downstream competitors and essential to 
downstream competition.272 
Two factors are taken into consideration when assessing the first of conditions. 
First, the inputs supplied by the vertically integrated firm must not have close 
substitutes. This is because a margin squeeze cannot be said to occur if the upstream 
product could reasonably be substituted by a comparative product. Secondly, the input 
must be essential in the downstream production process.273 This essentially entails 
that the technical features or nature of the upstream product allows for the provision 
of a derivative service or downstream product.274 
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In respect of the second condition, the input needs to be essential for downstream 
competition. In other words although the input may be essential for the production of 
a particular downstream product, there may be other products in the downstream 
market that do not use the input.275  
 
(iii) Effect of Vertically Integrated Firm’s Prices on an Efficient Competitor – 
Imputation Test 
The Competition Tribunal adopted a two pronged approach in determining whether 
this element was satisfied. First, in response to an allegation by Senwes that its 
competitors were inefficient, the Competition Tribunal elaborated on criteria against 
which it found that two firms (Cargill and Dreyfus) were on a balance of probabilities 
efficient. The criteria included the fact that the firms had been in the market for a long 
period of time, the fact that the firms were among the largest in the world and the fact 
that the firms were also responsible for new innovations in the markets such as mill 
door contracts.276 Although the criteria may be instructive when ascertaining a firm’s 
efficiency, they are not as stand alone criteria sufficient to reach a conclusive finding 
of same.277 
The court also looked at a second test being, whether Senwes’ downstream trading 
arm could continue to operate if it was charged the same upstream prices that its rivals 
were charged.278 Senwes failed to adduce any evidence to refute this allegation 
(despite the fact that it would have been in the best position to do so) and it was 
accordingly inferred by the Court that this condition was satisfied.279 
From the above it is apparent that the courts have adopted the approach used in 
the European Communities. This approach is known as the imputation test and is 
utilised for purposes of determining the effect of a vertically integrated firm’s prices 
on an efficient competitor. In other words, an imputation test is a test that attempts to 
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quantify whether a competitors downstream retail margin is reasonable.280 The 
European Communities Access Notice (“Access Notice”)281 is the only formal 
recordal of the imputation test for the European Communities.282 Although it relates 
to the telecommunications sector, its applicability is not limited to this sector.283 The 
Access Notice sets out two tests being: 
‘Test 1: A price squeeze could be demonstrated by showing that the 
dominant company's own downstream operations could not trade 
profitably on the basis of the upstream price charged to its competitors by 
the upstream operating arm of the dominant company.’284 
‘Test 2: …a price squeeze could also be demonstrated by showing that the 
margin between the price charged to competitors on the downstream 
market (including the dominant company's own downstream operations, if 
any) for access and the price which the network operator charges in the 
downstream market is insufficient to allow a reasonably efficient service 
provider in the downstream market to obtain a normal profit (unless the 
dominant company can show that its downstream operation is 
exceptionally efficient).’285 
Although somewhat similar, the tests differ in two fundamental aspects. First, test 
one refers to the profitability of the vertically integrated firm’s downstream operation 
whereas test two refers to the profitability of ‘reasonably efficient service provider 
(read downstream competitor).286 In both instances, the profitability is measured by 
determining the margin between the cost of the input supplied by the vertically 
integrated firm and the selling price of either the vertically integrated firm’s 
downstream operation or of the ‘reasonably efficient’ downstream competitor. The 
second difference is that failure to comply with the first test will result in a de facto 
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finding of margin squeeze (assuming all other elements have been complied with). In 
respect of the second test, even if it is proved that a reasonably efficient service 
provider could not trade profitably due to high input costs, the vertically integrated 
firms would still be entitled to raise the defence that its downstream operation is 
exceptionally efficient, thereby entitling it to charge such high input costs. 
In relation to calculation of costs, it should be noted that as a general rule the costs 
to be used should be the lowest of either the vertically integrated firm’s downstream 
operation or that of the downstream competitor.287 In addition, the standard used to 
ascertain the costs of the ‘reasonably efficient operator’ (as contemplated in the 
second of the Access Notice tests) is either ‘the actual costs incurred by existing firms 
or (2) the costs of a[n] hypothetical efficient downstream firm based on forward 
looking Long Run Incremental Costs (LRIC) estimates.’288 
These tests and in particular the second of the imputation tests, present their own 
challenges. For instance, whereas the costs of a vertically integrated firm’s 
downstream operation may be known, the costs of a reasonably efficient service 
provider are more challenging to ascertain. It is for this reason that most competition 
authorities opt for the first of the two tests. In this regard, it is interesting to note that 
the second test (when determining the effect of a vertically integrated firm’s prices on 
an efficient competitor) applied by the Competition Tribunal is in actual fact the first 
of the imputation tests described in the Access Notice.289  
Another challenge of the Access Notice tests and in particular the second test is 
that the efficiency of downstream competitors could actually be counted against 
them.290 In other words, the more efficient a downstream competitor is, the more 
difficult it would be to establish a margin squeeze due to the fact that the high input 
costs of the vertically integrated firm would be negated by the cost saving efficiency 
of the downstream competitor. 
Another challenge of the Access Notice tests relating to the first test occurs when 
the vertically integrated firm incurs additional costs when it supplies its downstream 
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competitors.291 It has been suggested that these costs be included when making the 
relevant calculations.292 
It is submitted that in the context of South African law, it may be beneficial to 
utilise the first test being the equally efficient competitor test. This is because it 
promotes the principle of legal certainty. In comparison to the reasonably efficient 
competitor test which requires a vertically integrated firm to speculate regarding its 
competitors costs or the costs of a ‘reasonably efficient competitor’, the equally 
efficient competitor test allows the vertically integrated firm the benefit of access to 
its own costs thereby enabling it to ascertain the lawfulness of its own conduct.293 
This is however, not to say that the reasonably efficient competitor test should never 
be considered. There may for instance be objective reasons to utilise the reasonably 
efficient competitor test, for instance if the vertically integrated undertaking’s cost 
structure cannot be assessed294 or the vertically integrated undertaking’s costs are 
unique due to its priviledged position.295 
The Competition Tribunal was fortunate in that the industry in respect of which 
the underlying margin squeeze abuse occurred, is a relatively simple industry,296 
thereby saving the Competition Tribunal from having to grapple with what can be an 
exceedingly complex issue. The downside to the simplicity of the Senwes industry is 
that the determination of the effect of vertically integrated firm’s prices on efficient 
competitors was not dealt with in as great a depth as its complexity warrants. It is 
hoped that future decisions will expand on this criteria.  
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(iv) Objective Justification 
As confirmed by the Competition Tribunal,297 this element (also referred to as the 
‘efficiency defence’) is similar to that considered in respect of section 8(c) above. It 
shall therefore not be dealt with again as this has already been discussed in detail 
above.  
 
(c) Elements Not Dealt With By Senwes Decision  
Although the Senwes decision defined the criteria against which it tested for a margin 
squeeze, there are two additional criteria or considerations that it did not deal with and 
that could be of significance for future cases. 
 
(i) Sufficient Duration 
Margin squeeze cases must be of a sufficiently long duration in order to have an 
exclusionary effect.298 This aspect was dealt with in the Senwes decision,299 but was 
not identified as a significant element of a margin squeeze. The reason that this 
element is significant is that temporary or short-term changes in prices from either an 
upstream or downstream perspective cannot be considered as margin squeezes.300 On 
this point, in Napier Brown – British Sugar it was held that a margin squeeze would 
have occurred if British Sugar had maintained its pricing policy for the long term.301 
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(ii) Duty to Deal 
The duty to deal would not apply in a regulated market which requires the vertically 
integrated firm to make available the upstream input to its downstream competitors. 
This is because the competition law duty to deal is replaced with a regulatory duty to 
deal.302 The competition law concept of a duty to deal accordingly arises primarily in 
unregulated (or potentially semi-regulated) markets. 
The linkline303 decision resulted in the divergence of US and the European 
Union’s position on margin squeeze.304 As mentioned above, Linkline refers to the 
decision of Trinko,305 in which Justice Scalia referring to the Colgate306 case 
confirmed that the Sherman Act does not create an obligation to trade or deal, and that 
a private enterprise may freely exercise its discretion as to whom to interact with 
where there is no such duty.307 The question arises whether South African courts 
should make the same considerations.  
On this point, section 8(b) of the Competition Act requires a firm to give a 
competitor access to an essential facility. It appears that this provision may impose a, 
‘duty to deal’ in a manner similar to that contemplated in the aforementioned US 
cases. With this in mind, South African courts may very well find that the enquiry 
into whether or not an input is essential may be extended to include an enquiry into 
whether or not the ‘essential input’ is also an ‘essential facility’. 
 
(d) Criticisms of the Margin Squeeze Concept  
The margin squeeze concept has been the subject of criticism, particularly in US 
jurisprudence. 
 
(i) Price Regulation 
Linkline identified a number of inherent challenges to cases based on the margin 
squeeze cause of action. The most significant of these challenges is that these cases 
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require courts (or competition authorities) to engage in the challenging task of 
monitoring both the wholesale and retail prices of products, which effectively 
amounts to “aiming at a moving target”.308 The competition authority would face 
challenging questions such as having to ascertain the true economic value of the 
upstream input, the extent to which demand affects economic value and importantly, 
determining what would be a reasonable mark-up on the upstream input.309 This in 
effect forces competition authorities to assume the role of not only price regulators (a 
role which the competition authorities are not willing310 and or well placed to 
assume).311 Another challenge is that regulation may take the more complex form of 
supervising the terms and conditions attached to the provision of the upstream 
input.312 This in turn forces competition authorities to assume the roles of industry 
regulators. Instead, this role should be given to industry specific regulators313 that 
presumably have the resources and expertise to handle such enquiries.  
The effect of these criticisms can be partially mitigated if, as discussed above, an 
‘equally efficient competitor’ test is adopted when determining whether a margin 
squeeze is excluding competitors. This is based on the assumption that a competition 
authority assumes the role of a price regulator when it utilises the ‘reasonably 
efficient’ competitor test due to the fact that it undertakes the mammoth task of 
ascertaining the market related prices. In addition, whatever ruling is made when 
using the ‘reasonably efficient’ competitor test will invariably act as the benchmark 
against which other affected firms will have to comply. However, when using the 
‘equally efficient competitor’ test, the competition authority not only gets to enjoy the 
relative simplicity of relying on the offending firm’s prices but also avoids having to 
set a benchmark that is acceptable to the industry due to the fact that its ruling is 
limited to the disparity in prices between the litigating firms. 
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(ii) Undermining the Consumer Welfare Approach 
The theoretical implication of the margin squeeze concept could be interpreted as 
undermining consumer welfare. This is because requiring a vertically integrated firm 
to warrant that its competitor enjoys a sufficient margin, results in the substitution of 
an approach that favours consumer welfare for an approach that favours competitor 
welfare.314 Similarly, it is impossible to simultaneously ensure a competitor maintains 
profitability while maintaining that the ultimate goal is to ensure consumer welfare.315 
Consumers would accordingly suffer harm when the vertically integrated firm, in light 
of its legitimate desire to avoid liability in terms of the margin squeeze concept, is 
either forced to maintain prices that are artificially high or is forced to withdraw the 
goods from the market in an effort to avoid liability.316 
There is also the danger that the vertically integrated firm would be forced to 
effectively subsidize the operations of a less efficient competitor, thereby reducing the 
benefits of lower prices that would have accrued to consumers had the firms been 
allowed to compete without interruption.317 
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Finally, there may be advantages to having a monopolist in a particular market. 
For one, the monopolist may be more efficient than its competitors which efficiency 
could be translated into lower prices. Secondly, the consumers may also enjoy lower 
prices when the monopolist not only sells its own products but also those of the 
competitors that it squeezed out at a lower price by virtue of the absorbed capital 
input costs.318 It could accordingly be argued (subject to the many known 
disadvantages of monopoly power) that it may be disadvantageous to utilise the 
margin squeeze cause of action to restrict the activities of a vertically integrated 
monopolist. 
 
(iii) Conflicting Cause of Action 
In attempting to remedy the economic pressures that a downstream competitor may be 
facing, such firm may be tempted to request the vertically integrated firm to raise its 
prices. Unfortunately, such behaviour may be viewed as price fixing behaviour. The 
vertically integrated firm would therefore find itself in a situation in which it is forced 
to choose between raising its prices thereby falling foul of price fixing criteria, or 
maintaining its low prices thereby falling foul of margin squeeze criteria.319 
 
(iv) Unnecessary Cause of Action 
It has been argued that behaviour that could be classified as margin squeeze type 
behaviour could in some instances also be classified into a number of other categories 
of established abuse classifications. For instance, this could include predatory 
pricing,320 price discrimination or excessive pricing.321 This argument is, however, not 
entirely consistent in that it is possible to demonstrate that the elements of a margin 
squeeze abuse differ from those of predatory pricing, price discrimination or 
excessive pricing. For instance, it has been held that a margin squeeze abuse cannot 
be classified as predatory pricing due to the fact that a margin squeeze abuse can take 
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place without having to show that the dominant firm has suffered losses and intends 
on recouping same.322 Another example emanates from Albion Water Limited v Dŵr 
Cymru Cyfyngedig in which it was held that a margin squeeze cannot be compared to 
excessive pricing because whereas a margin squeeze relates to the relation between 
the prices charged at the upstream and downstream levels, excessive pricing relates to 
the justification of the levels of either price.323 
There is also the danger that this cause of action could conflict with or cause 
uncertainty when a regulatory body has accepted an upstream or downstream price 
levied by the offending firm as was in the case of Deutsche Telekom.324 This is 
unfortunate because firms will not be able to confidently rely on the decisions of a 
regulatory body despite the fact that they are ostensibly best placed to determine 
whether the proposed prices are in fact detrimental to competition within the relevant 
market. This could result in firms adopting a more conservative approach in favour of 
their competitors (and, it is submitted, to the detriment of the consumers) despite 
having the support of the relevant regulatory body. 
 
(v) Deterrent to Efficiency and Innovation 
A threat of a margin squeeze prosecution deters innovation and efficiency-seeking 
behaviour of firms. This is the case particularly when the upstream product is 
produced voluntarily (i.e. it is not mandated to do so by regulation) by a vertically 
integrated firm. Such a firm may be deterred from continuing to provide this input at 
the risk of incurring liability.325 This demonstrates the necessity of ensuring that the 
affected firm is in fact operating efficiently before determining whether or not it was 
priced out of the market. 
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South African Courts have recently had the opportunity to ascertain the applicability 
of the margin squeeze in South Africa when on 20 December 2006, the Competition 
Commission referred a case to the Competition Tribunal against Senwes following a 
complaint by CTH Trading (Pty) Ltd.326 
Although a margin squeezes can take various forms, the fundamental principle 
behind the concept is that a margin squeeze occurs when a vertically integrated firm 
leverages its upstream dominance in such a manner as to put pressure on its 
downstream rivals profit making capacity. 
Internationally, the concept is not adopted universally. Whereas the concept is 
generally accepted in Europe, the United Kindgom, Canada and Australia, the US has 
relatively recently changed its stance towards the principle and has now rejected its 
utility. 
The case against Senwes found its way to the Constitutional Court which upheld 
the finding of the Competition Tribunal save that it was amended by deleting the word 
‘margin squeeze’. It is submitted that this aspect of the ruling is absurd and 
unnecessary because although the term ‘margin squeeze’ will no longer be recognised 
in South African legal jurisprudence, the principles underpinning the concept will 
nevertheless form part of South African Competition Law jurisprudence. In addition, 
it is recognised that these principles will find application under the provisions of 
section 8(c) of the Competition Act. It is accordingly submitted that it was 
unnecessary to do away with the label of ‘margin squeeze’ as the label does not of 
itself carry any weight in the adjudication of margin squeeze cases. 
The principles underpinning the margin squeeze concept are that the offending 
firm must be shown to be vertically integrated. It must also be established that 
upstream input is essential for downstream competition. The vertically integrated 
firm’s prices should render the activities of an efficient rival uneconomic and finally, 
there must not be an objective justification for the vertically integrated firm’s pricing 
                                                





strategy.327 Additional criteria should also be taken into consideration when 
adjudicating a margin squeeze complaint. This criteria includes that the margin 
squeeze must be conducted for a sufficient duration in order to qualify as a margin 
squeeze. Another consideration is that courts may find it necessary to consider 
whether the essential input is also an ‘essential facility’ (i.e. whether the offending 
firm has a ‘duty to deal’) as contemplated in the Competition Act, as part of the 
margin squeeze inquiry. 
The elements for the applicability of section 8(c) are that (i) the offending firm 
must be shown to be dominant as contemplated in the Competition Act; (ii) the 
offending firm must have engaged in exclusionary conduct; (iii) the exclusionary 
conduct must not be capable of being classified under section 8(d) of the Competition 
Act; and (iv) the exclusionary act must not be objectively justifiable. Additional 
criteria also need to be considered including that a first time contravention of section 
8(c) does not attract an administrative penalty. Intention is also not considered as a 
requirement of section 8(c), although it may be considered when testing other criteria. 
It is also not necessary to prove harm to a third party for purposes of satisfying the 
requirements of section 8(c). 
The additional criteria mentioned above are indicative of the fact that the various 
courts dealing with the Senwes case failed to adequately address the elements 
necessary to establish a margin squeeze. This failure was also evident in that the 
courts failed to adequately elaborate on a number of the established elements. For 
instance, when determining the effect of vertically integrated firm’s prices on an 
efficient competitor the courts failed to elaborate on the imputation test by at the very 
least describing the various approaches it considered and the rational for choosing the 
approach that it did. The courts also failed to elaborate on whether the input needs to 
be essential both to downstream competitors and essential to downstream 
competition. This is lack of elaboration does however have with it the advantage that 
the courts will in future enjoy a measure of flexibility in interpreting the margin 
squeeze cause of action. It is also important to bear in mind that the lack of 
elaboration may also be attributed to the simple nature of the upstream and 
                                                





downstream input and markets, thereby making it unnecessary for the court to delve 
into much detail when critically analysing the cause of action. 
The main criticism levelled against the margin squeeze cause of action is that it 
would require the courts to assume the role of a price and/or industry regulator. This 
is a role that the courts are neither willing nor well placed to assume. Other criticisms 
include that it would result in the undermining of the consumer welfare approach 
replacing it instead with a ‘competitor welfare approach’. It would also place the 
vertically integrated firm in the conflicting position of having to choose between 
falling foul of price fixing allegations if it were to raise its prices to match that of its 
upstream competitors or falling foul of margin squeeze allegations if it retains low 
upstream input prices. Finally, the cause of action could also be said to be a deterrent 
to efficiency and innovation due the fact that there is little incentive for the vertically 
integrated firm to provide an upstream input (particularly if it is provided voluntarily) 
at the risk of incurring liability as a result of low prices, especially if such prices are 
obtained as a result of inherent efficiencies.  
All in all, there is certainly scope for the development of the margin squeeze 
principle. This will be of particular necessity when it comes to elaborating on the 
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